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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a memorandum decision entered on 
May 11, 1992 and an order thereon entered on July 15, 1992 
amending the December 12, 1991 decree of divorce to award attorney 
fees directly to plaintiff's counsel. 
Jurisdiction to hear the instant appeal lies in the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of section 78-2a-
3(2)(h). Utah Code Annotated, which provides the following: 
The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: . . . appeals from district court 
involving domestic relations cases, including but not 
limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney 
fees directly to trial counsel and, if so, whether such error is 
harmless. 
II. Whether the trial court viol at ed defendant's right 
to procedural due process in entering its memorandum decision of 
May 11, 1992. 
III. Whether the trial court erred in granting 
plaintiff's January 28, 1992 Rule 60 motion. 
IV. Whether the entry by the trial court of its May 
11, 1992 memorandum decision was an abuse of discretion. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
1 
1. The constitution of the state of Utah, article I, 
section 7, provides that: 
No person shal1 be deprived of 1 ife, !iberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
2. Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-3, as amended 
1953, provides the following: 
The court may order either party to pay to the 
clerk a sum of money for the separate support and 
maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and to 
enable such party to prosecute or defend the action. 
3. Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-51-41, as amended 
1989, provides the following: 
The compensation of an attorney and counselor 
for services is governed by agreement, express or 
implied, which is not restrained by law. From the 
commencement of an action, or the service of an answer 
containing a counterclaim or at the time that the 
attorney and client enter into a written or oral 
employment agreement, the attorney who is so employed has 
a lien upon the client/s cause of action or counterclaim, 
which attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, 
decision, or judgment in the client's favor and to the 
proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come, and 
cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties 
before or after judgment. Any written employment 
agreement shall contain a statement that the attorney has 
a lien upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim. 
4. Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
Every action shall be prosecuted, in the name of 
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, 
guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party 
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for 
the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute 
may sue in that person's name without joining the party 
for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a 
statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of 
another shall be brought in the name of the state of 
Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it 
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after 
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objection for ratification of commencement of the action 
by, or joinder or substitution of the real party in 
interest; and such ratification, joinder , or 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action 
had been commenced in the name of the real party in 
interest. 
5. Rule 54(c)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provides that: 
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is 
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded * such 
relief in his pleadings* It may be given for or against 
one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the 
justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate 
rights of the parties on each side as between or among 
themse1ves. 
6. Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that: 
A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall 
be served not later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment. 
7.. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
that: 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in any 
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the 
court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a 
new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, 
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
8. Rule 4-501(l)(d), Code of Judicial Administration 
provides that: 
Upon the expiration of the five-day period to 
file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the 
Clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision-
The notification shall be in the form of a separate 
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written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for 
Decision". The notification shall contain a certificate 
of mailing to all parties- If neither party files a 
notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
9. Rule 4~501(3)(a)t Code of Judicial Administration 
provides that: 
A decision on a motion shal1 be rendered 
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or 
requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) 
or (4) below- [emphasis added] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a divorce action- Subsequent to 
protracted district court proceedings, the court rendered its 
decree resolving custody, visitation and property distribution 
which included an award of attorney fees. Defendant's counsel, 
contrary to direct instructions from the court, refused to forward 
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to trial 
counsel for approval as to form. The court, unaware of this 
refusal, entered the final decree in the form presented by 
defendant- Upon being made aware of the entry of the decree, 
plaintiff moved the court for relief as it related to attorney fees 
for trial counsel- On May 11, 1992 the court entered its order 
granting attorney fees to plaintiff's counsel- Defendant appeals-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 28, 1991, trial in the instant action 
terminated with the court ruling, inter alia, that defendant pay 
attorney fees in the amount of $7,500.00-
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2. Subsequently, ana on a continuing basis, differences 
arising over the form of the findings, decree and other matters 
continued by motion, response, and occasional order and amended 
decree. 
3. On October 9, 1991 the court rendered its memorandum 
decision (exhibit A) containing its ruling on plaintiffs August 
16, 1991 objections to defendant's proposed findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and judgment (filed August 20, 1991) and 
specifically directing that: 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare new 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree 
consistent with this decision, submit them to opposing 
Counsel for approval as to form and then to the court for 
signature* [emphasis added] 
4. On October 21, 1991 defendant's counsel was informed 
that: 
Inasmuch as I have not heard from you regarding 
the preparation of new findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and judgment as directed by Judge Noel in his 
memorandum decision of October 9, 1991, I wish to notify 
you that, unless payment in full of the amounts awarded 
as attorney fees are made prior to November 1, 1991, I 
will cause execution to issue to obtain such funds from 
your client. (R. 1022) 
5. On October 25, 1991 defendant's counsel, 
notwithstanding the court's order that any findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgement be submitted to plaintiff's 
counsel responded by stating: 
I have been dealing with Mr. Watts on this 
matter since he entered an appearance in this case. He 
related tome that you have refused to file a withdrawal. 
If you feel I should be dealing with you on the case, 
please advise and let me see something from one of you 
signed by Tamera McDonald stating which of you represents 
her. (R. 1023) 
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6. On October 26, 1991, and in response to the 
foregoing, defendant's counsel was informed as follows: 
I read with great surprise your letter of 
October 25, 1991. Please oe advised that I am counsel of 
record and, unless and until you are advised otherwise by 
me, will remain so. 
I believe the rules specify that, in the event 
a party is represented by more than one attorney, you are 
obligated to provide notice of your activities to ooth. 
To the extent that you have communicated with 
other counsel without notifying me. please forward to me 
any and all documents involved in such communication and 
inform me (in writing) of the time, date and content of 
any oral communications with Mr. Watts to which I was not 
a party. (R. 1024) 
7. On Octooer 30, 1991, notwithstanding the failure of 
defendant to submit same to plaintiff's trial counsel for approval 
as ordered by the court, the initial decree of divorce was entered, 
paragraph 14 thereof providing: 
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant 
in the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($7,500.00) as attorney's fees. (R. 920) 
8. On Decemoer 12, 1991 an amended decree of divorce 
was entered, paragraph 14 thereof providing: 
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant 
in the sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
(37,500.00) as attorney's fees. (R. 989) 
9. On January 28, 1992, plaintiff filed her Rule 60 
motion for stay of entry of order and to set aside judgment re 
attorney fees. (R. 1016/1024). 
10. On February 5, 1992, defendant filed his response to 
plaintiff's above referenced Rule 60 motion, stating therein that: 
The Decree that has carried the language upon 
which the Court has ruled was reviewed by Mr. Guyon over 
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a considerable period of time; it was a decree to which 
he made numerous objections, but at no time did he make 
objections to the language with which he now disagrees, 
[emphasis added] (R. 1026) 
11* On April 6, 1992 plaintiff, and in compliance with 
the requirements of Rule 4-501(d) notified the court that the 
referenced Rule 60 motion was submitted to the court for its 
decision, (Exhibit B) 
12. On May 11, 1992 the trial court entered its 
memorandum decision stating in relevant part that: 
The Court has reviewed the entire history regarding this 
"Attorney/s Fees'1 matter and now enters an Order 
disposing of these motions and resolving the issue of 
plaintiffs attorneys fees. 
The Court previously entered a minute entry dated 
the 16th day of January, 1992 indicating that Mr. Guyon 
should look to plaintiff for payment of his attorneys 
fees. That opinion was based on the precise wording of 
the decree of divorce which stated: 
"Plaintiff is awarded judgment 
against defendant in the sum of $7,500.00 
(Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) as 
attorneys fees." 
The Court is of the opinion that the precise 
wording of the Decree required that result. 
Mr. Guyon has now filed a Motion to Set Aside 
that judgment relating to attorneys fees relying on Rule 
60 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
After reviewing the entire matter, including 
portions of the court transcript cited by the parties, 
and the court's notes together with the Courts 
recollection of this matter, the Court is oCof] the 
opinion that Mr. Guyon's motion is well taken. It was 
and is the Court's intent that Mr. Guyon be given a 
judgment for attorneys fees for services rendered up to 
the time of the court's order awarding attorneys fees. 
The technical language that finally emerged in this 
matter (although the specific issue here presented was 
not addressed earlier) granted the judgment in favor of 
plaintiff rather than to Mr. Guyon. (R. 1068/1069) 
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13• On July 15, 1992 the court, based upon the iMay 11, 
1992 memorandum decision entered its amendment to judgment stating: 
CI It is hereby ordered that said December 12, 1991 decree 
be and hereby is amended to provide, in lieu of payment 
of attorney fees directly to plaintiff, as follows: 
Defendant shall pay directly to Edwin F. Guyon 
as counsel for plaintiff, as attorney fees, 
the sum of $7,500.00. (R. 1207/1208) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court did not err in awarding attorney 
fees directly to trial counsel. If such award was error, such 
error is harmless. 
2* The trial court did not violate defendants right to 
procedural due process in entering its memorandum decision of May 
11, 1992. 
3, The trial court did not err in granting plaintiff's 
January 28, 1992 Rule 60 motion. 
4, The entry by the trial court of its May 11, 1992 
memorandum decision was not an abuse of discretion. 
ISSUE I -- ERROR, IF ANY IN ENTERING ORDER 
AWARDING FEES DIRECTLY TO ATTORNEY, WAS HARMLESS 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. An appellate court reviewing cases in equity has the 
duty and prerogative, where warranted, but only upon a full review 
of fact and law, to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the 
trial court with the caveat that the trial court's action 
should not be disturbed except to prevent manifest injustice. 
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Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1982); Jackson v. Jackson, 
617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980); Mitchel1 v. Mitchel1 . 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 
1974). 
2. The burden is upon the appellant to prove that the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings as made; or 
there was a misunderstanding or misapp1icat i on of the 1 aw resu11 ing 
in substantial and prejudicial error; or a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Mitchel1 v. 
Mitchel1 . 527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974); Harding v. Harding. 488 
P.2d 308 (Utah 1971): Searle v. Searle. 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974). 
PARTIES IN INTEREST 
3. The purpose of Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the reason the defendant has the right to have a 
cause of action prosecuted by the real party in interest is so that 
the judgment will preclude any action on the same demand by another 
and permit the defendant to assert all defenses or counterclaims 
available against the real owner of the cause. Shaw v. Jeppson, 
239 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1952) 
4. The provisions of Rule 54(c)(1) are consistent with 
the general principle that a trial court may not render judgment in 
favor of a nonparty. Courts can generally make a legally binding 
adjudication only between the parties actually joined in the 
action. Hiltslev v. Ryder. 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987). 
ATTORNEY FEES 
5* Early in Utah family law jurisprudence the Utah 
Supreme Court took the position that a decree in favor of a party/s 
9 
attorney was void for lack of jurisdiction- Openshaw v. Openshaw, 
12 P.2d 364, 365 (Utah 1932); Rolando v. District Court, 271 P. 225 
(Utah ); Brown v. Brown, 8 P.2d 452 (Ariz ) and concluded that the 
decree should be amended so as to make it run in favor of the party 
to the case, Qpenshaw, supra. 
6, When issues arising over payment of fees to the 
Openshaw attorney gave rise to additional litigation, the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected Openshaw"s argument that an improper remedy, 
i.e. an action in conversion, was sought and declared such a claim 
without merit, relying on Section 104-1-2 Utah Code Annotated, 1943 
which provides: 
There is in this state but one form of civil 
action for the enforcement or protection of private 
rights and the redress or prevention of private wrongs. 
and held that: 
Under this section this court has held that a 
pleader is not required to follow any particular form or 
special theory in stating the facts, and if the facts 
stated entitled plaintiff to any relief under the 
substantive law, then he has stated what is termed "a 
good cause of action", and the court must enter judgment 
in his favor so far as any attack upon the sufficiency of 
the pleading is concerned. Williams v. Ne1 son, 145 P. 
39, 41 (Utah ); Hanson v. Openshaw, 155 P.2d 410, 411-12 
(Utah 1945). 
7. Subsequently the Utah Supreme Court has taken the 
position that: 
In the absence of a statute, let it be conceded 
that an attorney in a divorce action has no lien either 
on the cause of action or on the judgment or on the 
proceeds thereof in favor of his client, but in this 
state we have an attorney's lien statute. It, R.S. Utah 
1933, 6-0-40, provides: "The compensation of an attorney 
and counselor for his services is governed by agreement, 
express or implied, which is not restrained by law. From 
the commencement of an action, or the service of an 
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answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who 
appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of 
action or counterclaim, which attached to a verdict, 
report, decision or judgment in his client's favor and to 
the proceeds thereof in whosesoever hands they may come, 
and cannot be affected by any settlement between the 
parties before or after judgment. Hampton v. Hampton. 32 
P.2d 703, 706 (Utah 1945). 
and further, that: 
Under such a statute, we think the weight of 
authority (citations omitted), at least on principle, is 
to the effect that the lien attaches in all cases, 
including divorce actions. Id. 
8. It has been held, in Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331, 1336 (Utah App 1988) that: 
A trial court has the power to award attorney 
fees in divorce proceedings, pursuant to Utah Cod Ann. 
section 30-3-3 (1984). Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 
(Utah 1980). The decision to make such an award and the 
amount thereof rest primarily in the sound discretion of 
the trial court. J_d. However, the award must be based 
on evidence of both financial need and reasonableness. 
Beals v. Beals. 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984). 
9. In Albrechtsen v. Albrechtsen, 414 P.2d 970, 971 
(Utah 1966), an action in which a non-party attorney appealed an 
order quashing a writ of garnishment, the Supreme Court, stating 
that the proper procedure would be for the attorney to intervene 
for the purpose of determining the amount and extent of his lien 
and then have it enforced, concluded that, under the circumstances, 
the attorney had no standing and dismissed the appeal. 
HARMLESS ERROR/UTAH 
10. Rule 61 places upon appellant the burden of showing 
not only that an error occurred, but that it was substantial and 
prejudicial in that the appellant was deprived in some manner of a 
full and fair consideration of the disputed issue by the finder of 
11 
fact. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987); Onveabor v. Pro 
Roofing. Inc. . 787 P.2d 525 (Utah Civ App 1990). 
11. When parties have been afforded an opportunity to 
present their claims to a court or jury in a fair trial and a 
verdict and judgment is entered, all presumptions are in favor of 
the validity of the verdict and judgment. Joseph v. V.H. Groves 
Latter-Dav Saints Hospital. 348 P.2d 935 (Utah 1966). 
12. Where the parties have been afforded a trial, a 
presumption arises that the judgment should not be disturbed unless 
the one attacking it meets the requirement of showing that the 
error is substantial and prejudicial, in the sense that there is 
reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different in 
absence of such error. Hal 1 v. Blackman, 417 P.2d 664 (1966). 
13. Since the appellant has the burden of demonstrating 
that any error has affected his substantial rights, every 
reasonable presumption in favor of the validity of a general 
verdict must be taken as true on appeal . Leigh Furniture & Carpet 
Company v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). 
14. A party who takes a position that leads a court into 
error, or who by conduct approves the error committed by the court, 
cannot later take advantage of the error in procedure. He 1 man v. 
Paterson, 241 P.2d 910 (Utah 1952). 
15. An appellate court will not reverse a judgment for 
mere error, unless the error involved Is substantial and 
prejudicial. Kesler v. Rogers. 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975. 
16. An error is harmful only if the likelihood of a 
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different outcome is high enough to undermine confidence in the 
verdict- Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 
1991). 
HARMLESS ERROR/OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
17. In actions in other jurisdictions in which questions 
similar to those of the instant action, an approach has been 
followed that declares the matter to be generally harmless: 
The husband's argument that it was error for 
the court to order the payment of fees directly to the 
wife's attorney is well-founded. The case of Louthian 
andMerritt. P.A. v. Davis. 272 S.C. 330, 251 S.E.2d. 757 
(1979), disapproves of this method of awarding attorney's 
fees. In Louthian and Merritt, P.A., supra, our Supreme 
Court stated that because a claim for attorney's fees 
incidental to a divorce action is purely personal, they 
are to be awarded to the litigant and not to the 
attorney. The trial court erred, then, in awarding 
attorney's fees directly to the wife's attorney; however, 
the error in their award is not reversible because no 
prejudice to the husband has been shown, [citations 
omitted] The award of attorney's fees, therefore, is 
affirmed. Re i d v. Re i d, 312 S.E.2d 724, 730 (S.C.App 
1984) 
18. The above decision is based in substantial part upon 
an earlier South Carolina case in which the court stated: 
In his final exception, the husband contends 
that the lower court erred in directing that the 
attorneys' fees be paid directly to the attorneys. Code 
Section 20-112 provides that the court may allow the wife 
suit money. Counsel for the husband argues that an order 
granting payment directly to the attorneys is void. The 
wife's attorneys acknowledge ". . . that the preferred 
practice is to order attorneys' fees paid to the party, 
• • .." Traditionally in this State, in divorce actions 
fees have been ordered paid directly to counsel. 
Normally, there is no reason to contest such payment and 
this Court is not aware of any evils growing out of the 
pract ice. 
In the original order, the trial judge provided 
for "a reasonable attorneys' fee to be paid to her 
attorneys for defending the action." This apparently 
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caused no concern on the first appeal, nor at the hearing 
on remand. 
The principle is we I 1 settled that error is not 
reversible unless prejudice to the complaining party may 
have resulted therefrom. 
Assuming error in directing that the fees be 
paid directly to the attorneys, no prejudice to the 
husband has been shown. The wife testified in the court 
below in behalf of the motion of her attorneys, whereby 
they sought payment and ". . . a n order setting a 
reasonable attorneys'' fee for the undersigned attorneys 
. . ." Neither the husband nor the wife is in a position 
to complain, and a reversal on this ground is not 
required, [emphasis added] Darden v. Witham, 209 S.E.2nd 
42, 47 (S.C. 1974). 
19. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Owens v. Owens, 
264 P.2d 341 (Okla 1953), an action in which the appellant contends 
that an attorney fee allowance is void on account of the manner in 
which it was stated in the judgment reasoned as follows: 
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed 
by the court that the plaintiff, 0.0. Owens, pay to said 
attorneys on or before March 1, 1945, the said sum of 
$2,000.00 and that plaintiff also pay the costs of this 
action. 
[the attorneys issued an execution on the above 
judgment, in response to which plaintiff filed a motion 
to quash] 
Upon application and hearing the court granted 
a nunc pro tunc order correcting the judgment so that as 
to the attorneys fees item it should read as a judgment 
"against the plaintiff 0.0. owens and in favor of the 
defendant Ester Webb Owens, for the use and benefit of 
defendants attorneys H.L. Smith and Guy S. Manatt. 
Plaintiff contends that the judgment for 
attorneys fees as stated in the original judgment, or as 
stated in the nunc pro tunc order is void as being a 
judgment in favor of persons not parties to the action, 
and contends that any order directing payment to the 
attorneys is void, [emphasis added] 
[the court distinguished on the law a case involving 
California judgment] 
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This court has never held that an attorney's 
fee allowance in a divorce case was void if ordered to be 
paid direct to the attorney. We have always taken a view 
contrary to California, because we have held that the 
attorneys for the wife in a divorce have a personal 
interest in the allowance of attorneys fees to the extent 
that the attorneys may in their own name enforce the 
payment of the same to themselves and for their own 
private benefit, though the wife does not participate in 
such proceedings with the attorneys, and though the wife 
might in fact be antagonistic to such enforcement by the 
attorneys, [citations omitted] 
This court has, over many years, recognized the 
validity of allowances of attorneys fees in divorce cased 
when the language used by the Judge and written in the 
journal entry named the attorneys in various ways, and in 
some cases where it referred to them, but did not name 
them, [citations omitted] Owens, supra.. at 341-342. 
20. Subsequent to an extensive analysis of prior cases 
in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court rehearsed the history of its 
position and made the following determination: 
In view of this well defined and well 
established policy in Oklahoma it is of but scant 
importance whether we uphold the order made in the 
subsequent proceedings, or uphold the original trial 
order when this fee al lowance was first ordered and made. 
Either way the plaintiff, husband, should pay the award 
made. 
If there was any error in the verbiage of the 
first order it was an irregularity only. It could have 
been corrected in drafting and approving the journal 
entry if either party had thought it of sufficient 
importance. 
The fact remains that the original trial judge 
intended to make, and did make an attorneys fee allowance 
against the husband. Every one understood it and no one 
questioned the fairness of the amount or the authority of 
the court to make such an allowance against the husband. 
There was acquiescence in the order and compliance with 
it to the extent of paying $200 thereof, and the balance 
should be paid as ordered by the court. 
The plaintiff contends the order was void on 
account of the use of the names of the attorneys in the 
manner they were used in the journal entry. but to 
15 
sustain that contention we must depart from the policy 
employed in many former cases and over a long period of 
years. It is not pointed out that any harm or evil has 
resulted form the application of this policy in any one 
of the many former cases , nor that harm or injury will 
result from its application in this case. 
Our policy authorizes attorneys in their own 
names to enforce attorneys fee awards in proper cases, as 
above cited, on the theory that they have individual or 
vested interests therein. Then of course it is logical 
to uphold orders which refer to them or name them as we 
have done in several above cited cases. 
We conclude the plaintiff was not entitled to 
have the execution quashed. The court properly denied 
his motion to quash. Id.
 f at 346. 
21. In the event the court committed error, said error 
was harmless, there being no prejudice alleged or shown. 
ISSUE II — THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
IN ENTERING ITS MAY 11, 1992 ORDER 
1. In the state of Utah, "Timely and adequate notice 
and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the very 
heart of procedural fairness." Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 
1211 (Utah 1983). 
2. While Utah law recognizes both procedural and 
substantive due process standards, Wells v. Children's Aid Society 
of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) the only claim by defendant 
herein relates to procedural due process, the general test for 
which is "fairness" in providing for notice and opportunity to be 
heard. Id., at 204. 
3. The much cited case of Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust, 399 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), adopted by the Utah Supreme 
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Court, sets out the classic requirements of adequate notice: 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of 
due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded 
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections* The notice must be of such 
nature as reasonably to convey the required information, 
and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested 
to make their appearance, [citations omitted] Id. , at 
1212. 
and further states: 
Many cases have held that where notice is 
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party of the nature 
of the proceedings against him or not given sufficiently 
in advance of the proceeding to permit preparation, a 
party is deprived of due process. Id. 
4. In an action involving the termination of parental 
rights, the Utah Supreme Court determined that: 
Impl icit in the due process clause of our state 
Constitution is that persons be afforded a hearing to 
determine their rights under the law. Gribble v. 
Cribble, 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978). 
5. The record is clear that defendant received a copy 
of plaintiff's rule 60 motion filed January 28, 1992 (R. 
1016/1024); filed his response in the form of a motion to dismiss 
(R. 1025/1027); received a notice to submit for decision (Ex. A); 
and received a copy of the court's memorandum decision (R. 
1068/1070) 
6. The procedures followed by the court comply, in all 
aspects, with the applicable procedural rules. Rule 4-501(3)(a) 
permits the court to enter its decision without a hearing unless 
requested by one of the parties. Defendant failed to request a 
hearing on this motion and waived his right to complain on appeal 
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that the absence of a hearing violates his right to due process* 
ISSUE III — THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S JANUARY 
28, 1992 RULE 60 MOTION 
1. Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the 
court to grant relief for any one of the six specific and one 
general reasons stated if filed within a reasonable time (3 months 
after entry for specific reasons 1 through 4). The period from 
October 10, 1991 to January 30, 1992 is three months* The motion 
was filed January 28, 1992, less than three months subsequent to 
the entry of the initial judgment, let alone the subsequent amended 
judgments. 
2. Rule 59 applies, if at all, only in allegations 
relating to "newly discovered evidence", a claim not at issue in 
the instant action. The motion was filed as a rule 60 motion; the 
court treated plaintiffs motion as a rule 60 motion; and the 
motion itself requests relief contemplated under rule 60. 
3. When parties have been afforded an opportunity to 
present their claims to a court or jury in a fair trial and a 
verdict and judgment is entered, all presumptions are in favor of 
the validity of the verdict and judgment. Joseph v. W.H. Groves 
Latter-Dav Saints Hospital. 348 P.2d 935 (Utah 1966). 
4. Where the parties have been afforded a trial, a 
presumption arises that the judgment should not be disturbed unless 
the one attacking it meets the requirement of showing that the 
error is substantial and prejudicial, in the sense that there is 
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reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different in 
absence of such error. Hal 1 v. 31ackman, 417 P.2d 664 (1966)* 
5* Since the appellant has the burden of demonstrating 
that any error has affected his substantial rights, every 
reasonable presumption in favor of the validity of a general 
verdict must be taken as true on appeal. Leigh Furniture 8* Carpet 
Company v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). 
ISSUE IV — THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
JANUARY 28, 1992 RULE 60 MOTION 
1. The court's October 9, 1991 memorandum decision 
clearly directs the defendant to forward proposed findings and 
judgment to plaintiff's trial counsel -- a requirement not met by 
defendant- The October 21/26, 1992 correspondence demonstrates 
that defendant's position was not inadvertent* It is further 
relevant that defendant's February 5, 1992 response to plaintiff's 
motion purports that the decree was in fact reviewed by plaintiff's 
counse1. 
2. A party who takes a position that leads a court into 
error, or who by conduct approves the error committed by the court, 
cannot later take advantage of the error in procedure. He 1 man v. 
Paterson. 241 P.2d 910 (Utah 1952). 
•3. Plaintiff adopts the reasoning in the foregoing 
sections in further support against a holding that the court abused 
its discretion in the instant action. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff, in retaining as trial counsel, Edwin F. Guyon, 
and entering into an agreement for his employment created by 
virtue of section 78-51-41, U.C.A. and cases thereunder an 
unrestrained lien for attorney fees on his behalf. 
At the conclusion of trial an award of $7,500.00 for 
attorney fees was rendered against defendant. No challenges as to 
the amount and extent of said lien have been made. 
While it may be that plaintiffs trial counsel has no 
standing to appeal the attorney fee issue, AIbrechtsen does not 
deny standing for purposes of appeal in the instant action to a 
named party. 
Defendant, himself an experienced trial attorney and 
present throughout all the proceedings at trial, represented on the 
record that he w&s willing to work with plaintiffs counsel on the 
matter of payment of fees, but has not. To now allege that the 
trial court erred and/or abused its discretion as it relates to due 
process and the memorandum decision of May 11, 1992 is 
inappropriate. 
Dated the ___ 4th day of November , 1992. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMERA A. MCDONALD, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : Civil No. 894901447 DA 
vs. : JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, : 
Defendant. : 
Now before the Court are plaintiff's Objections to 
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment. The Court has reviewed the objections together with 
the memos filed in support of and in response thereto and now 
rules as follows: 
The Court will make it's ruling by reference to the 
paragraph numbers contained in the document filed by plaintiff 
entitled "Objections to Proposed Findings and Judgment". 
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS: 
1. Plaintiff's objection is sustained. 
2. Plaintiff's objection is overruled. 
3. Plaintiff's objection is sustained. 
4. Plaintiff's objection is sustained. The Court has 
previously entered findings and conclusions regarding 
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jurisdiction and grounds for the divorce. 
5. Plaintiff's objection is overruled. The finding, 
that plaintiff argues should be included, has in substance been 
incorporated below in paragraph 17 (g) of defendant's proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
OBJECTIONS TO MIXED FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS: 
1. As a general statement under this section the Court 
agrees that there should not be a separate section entitled 
"Mixed Findings/Conclusions". The matters contained in that 
section should fall under the section entitled "Findings". The 
Court will refer specifically to paragraphs 14 through 17 of 
defendant's proposed Mixed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law as it appears that plaintiff is objecting to all of said 
paragraphs. 
Paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the Mixed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law should be deleted. 
Paragraph 17 (i) should be deleted as being redundant. 
Paragraph 17 (m) should be deleted as being a comment on 
the evidence and not a finding of fact. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Plaintiff's objection to paragraph 9;2;4 is sustained. 
Plaintiff's objection to paragraph 9;3;1 is sustained. 
Plaintiff's objection to paragraph 12;8;9 to 11 is 
overruled. 
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Plaintiffs objection to paragraph 14; 19; 1 et. seq. is 
sustained. 
OBJECTIONS TO DECREE: 
1. Plaintiff's objection is sustained. 
2. Said paragraph shall remain as written but with the 
following addition: 
"... or as the parties may agree." 
3. The Court sustains plaintiff's objections. 
4. The Court overrules plaintiff's objection. 
5. Plaintiff's objection is overruled. 
6. The Court sustains plaintiff's objection. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare new Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree consistent with this decision, 
submit them to opposing Counsel for approval as to form and then 
to the Court for signature. 
DATED this eft* 
day of October, 1991. 
FRANK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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